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Abstract 
Three experiments investigated predictions concerning asymmetrical patterns of implicit and 
explicit self-esteem change. Specifically, we investigated the influence of knowledge about 
the own self that is momentarily salient as well as the influence of affective valence 
associated with the self in memory on implicit and explicit self-esteem. The latter was 
induced by evaluative conditioning, the former by directed thinking about oneself. We found 
that while evaluative conditioning changed implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiment 
1), thinking about the own self altered explicit but not implicit self-esteem (Experiment 2). 
Moreover, in a third experiment, it could be shown that the effect of evaluative conditioning 
can spill over to the explicit level when participants are asked to focus on their feelings prior 
to making their self-report judgements (Experiment 3). Implications of our results are 
discussed in terms of recent controversies regarding dual process models of attitudes and 
associative versus propositional modes of information processing.  
 
Keywords: self-esteem, implicit measures, explicit measures, directed thinking, evaluative 
conditioning, dual process models 
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Changing Explicit and Implicit Attitudes: 
 The Case of Self-Esteem 
 The understanding of the self is probably one of the oldest and most doggedly 
investigated problems in psychology. Based on the analysis of William James (1890) social 
psychologists have accumulated a number of empirical findings which added to our 
fundamental understanding of its structure and functioning (for an overview see Baumeister, 
1998). A broad strand of research investigated the effects and benefits of self-esteem, that is, 
the global evaluation of the own self and the association of the own person with positive or 
negative attributes (Baumeister, 1998; von Collani & Herzberg, 2003) and the consequences it 
might have for a multitude of behavioural domains in life. High self-esteem is typically 
viewed as an indicator of psychological health and the popular media bombard people with 
the message that high self-esteem reflects optimal functioning and that it is a necessary 
precursor to productivity and happiness (Baumeister, 1998), but on the other hand it still 
remains unclear whether there are any causal relationships between self-esteem and 
psychological well-being (Baumeister, Campbell, Krüger, & Vohs, 2003). Nonetheless, many 
studies focused on possibilities to enhance the self-esteem level of individuals via different 
methods (success/failure feedback: Ybarra, 1999; mood induction: Brown & Mankowski, 
1993; directed thinking tasks: McGuire & McGuire, 1996; social comparisons: Stapel & 
Blanton, 2004, etc.). 
 Although the understanding of the self and self-esteem in particular has witnessed 
important progress in the last decades (Baumeister, 1998), social psychology theorizing about 
the self experienced a shift in recent years. Drawing on the distinction between explicit and 
implicit attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), many researchers distinguish between 
implicit and explicit self-esteem as well (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Whereas many 
researchers assume that explicit self-esteem, which can be measured by means of 
questionnaires, is conscious and deliberative in nature, they often regard implicit self-esteem 
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as the result of automatic self-evaluative processes that can be assessed with indirect 
measurement tools (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Specifically, implicit 
self-esteem is often conceptualized as an automatically activated self-attitude (e.g., Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995; Dijksterhuis, 2004) that is considered to have an automatic effect on the 
evaluation of self-associated and self-dissociated objects (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). With 
regard to measures of implicit self-esteem, only the Name Letter Preference Task (Nuttin, 
1985) and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) have 
demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). A 
theoretical integration of implicit and explicit self-esteem is aspired in dual-process theories 
of social information processing, that we will describe in the following paragraph. 
 Numerous theorists have posited that individuals process information through two 
qualitatively different, but interacting, cognitive systems (e.g., Fazio, 1986; Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Sloman, 1996; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; see also Chaiken & Trope, 1999 for an 
overview). One mode of information processing is fast, operating mainly through automatic 
processes drawing on associative associations in memory. In contrast to this associative mode, 
the rule-based or propositional mode is slow, requires a large amount of cognitive capacity, is 
flexible and is assumed to be largely based on symbolic rules. This distinction in processing 
modes is also relevant to explicit and implicit self-esteem. While explicit self-esteem refers to 
the rule-based or controlled mode of thinking (according to dual-process models of social 
information processing); implicit self-esteem refers to the associative or automatic mode. 
Thus implicit self-esteem is regarded as the product of automatic, intuitive processing of 
affective experiences and it is at least partly influenced by social interactions in early life 
(DeHart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006), whereas explicit self-esteem is attained through 
conscious and rational processing of self-relevant information.  
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 As implicit and explicit attitudes are influenced by different processes (Gawronski & 
Strack, 2004, Olson & Fazio, 2006, Rydell & McConnell, 2006), asymmetric attitude changes 
may occur, which in turn can lead to discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 
2006). It can therefore be expected that this might be true for implicit and explicit self-esteem, 
too. That’s why it seems to be a logical consequence that methods appropriate to change 
explicit self-esteem are not equally likely to influence implicit self-esteem as well. Further 
evidence for the assumption that implicit and explicit attitude changes are not symmetric 
stems from the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model (APE-Model), that was recently 
proposed by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). The model outlines the distinction between 
associative and propositional processes, a central distinction that has also been made by other 
dual-process-models in social cognition research (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). In particular, the associative processing mode can be characterized as 
activation of associations in memory, based on a spreading activation in a network. These 
associative processes are the basis for automatic affective reactions toward certain attitude 
objects, and can be assessed with indirect measures. The deliberative propositional processing 
mode can be described as flexible and highly adaptable to currently considered knowledge. It 
results in an evaluative judgment that can be captured with direct measures. Consequently, it 
is assumed that changes in associative knowledge structures should lead to changes in implicit 
attitudes in general and thus in implicit self-esteem whereas changes in propositional 
knowledge should lead to changes in explicit attitudes and hence in explicit self-esteem. 
Because it is believed that the information underlying explicit attitudes is introspectively 
accessible, people should be able to articulate reasons for their attitudes. Since the associative 
mode operates through automatic processes, it is assumed that individuals are not aware of the 
processes underlying implicit attitudes themselves. However, they may sometimes be aware 
of the product of processing – the automatic affective reaction (i.e., a positive or negative 
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feeling or intuition; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). According to Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2007) the automatic affective reaction can be transferred into a propositional 
format. In this case and if the automatic affective reaction is regarded as valid, individuals 
may rely on their intuition of their implicit attitudes when forming explicit evaluations 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Under these circumstances we 
may find corresponding changes in implicit and explicit self-attitudes in general and in 
implicit and explicit self-esteem in particular. 
 It has already been shown in the literature that some manipulation methods may have an 
influence on indirectly assessed self-esteem but did not affect self-reported self-esteem. 
Baccus, Baldwin, and Packer (2004), for instance, presented participants with a computer 
game in which self-relevant information was repeatedly paired with smiling faces, and found 
an increase in implicit self-esteem but not in explicit self-esteem. However, most studies 
investigating changes in explicit or implicit self-esteem used only one type of measurement 
tool: Either they employed direct measures to assess changes in explicit self-esteem (e.g., 
McGuire & McGuire, 1996; Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003; Ybarra, 1999) or they used 
indirect measures to see whether changes in implicit self-esteem occurred after the 
manipulation (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Hence, the study conducted by Baccus et al. (2004) is a 
positive exception in this research area, but a shortcoming is that the main focus of their study 
was to modify self-esteem in general and that they did not consider a possible dissociation 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Therefore, a study is needed in which experimental 
manipulations are introduced to systematically modify implicit and explicit self-esteem 
independently of each other. Empirical results indicating a dissociation of changes in explicit 
and implicit self-attitudes may then be taken as a support of theoretical models that 
distinguish different processing modes as basis for this kind of dissociation.  
Goals of the Present Research 
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 The present research was designed to shed some more light on the convergence or 
dissociation of changes in explicit or implicit self-esteem. Based on the above mentioned 
dual-process models we investigated the conditions under which an appropriate experimental 
manipulation would lead to a change of implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiments 1 
and 3), or would result in a modification of directly but not indirectly assessed self-esteem 
(Experiment 2). Specifically, we hypothesized that people exposed to, or are asked to retrieve 
information about the self would report a different explicit evaluation of the self while 
automatic self-evaluations should remain unchanged. In contrast, if an appropriate 
manipulation leads to changes in the structure of self-related associations in memory this 
should alter automatic evaluations of the self but not deliberative self-related judgements as 
long as the propositional image or intuition of the implicit attitude towards the self is regarded 
as inadequate source of the explicit self-evaluation. We designed three experiments to test our 
assumptions. The first experiment was conducted with the aim of providing evidence whether 
implicit self-esteem could be enhanced by changing the structure of affective associations in 
memory while explicit self-esteem should not be affected. An evaluative conditioning 
procedure was used for this purpose. In the second experiment, in contrast, we investigated if 
a directed thinking manipulation which is assumed to have an impact on propositional 
processing would result in a change of directly but not indirectly assessed self-esteem. 
Finally, in the third experiment, we investigated whether changes in implicit self-esteem can 
spill over to the level of explicit self-esteem, given appropriate conditions as specified by the 
APE-Model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was done in an attempt to test the prediction that changes in implicit self-
esteem but not explicit self-esteem should emerge when a condition is introduced that 
influences the structure of associations in memory, and hence the automatic affective 
reactions, resulting from these associations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). To address 
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these self-relevant associations, a subliminal evaluative conditioning procedure (EC) was 
used, because it (1) is typically regarded as an associative learning procedure (see De 
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Walther, Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005), (2) has been 
found to influence implicit self-esteem in earlier experiments (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004), and 
(3) has been found that EC effects occur without the awareness of the stimulus pairings. The 
idea behind EC is that pairings of an attitude object (conditioned stimulus or CS) with other 
stimuli of a certain valence (unconditioned stimulus or US) will change the attitude towards 
the attitude object in the direction of the stimuli it has been paired with. Hence, in Experiment 
1, some participants were repeatedly presented with trials in which the word “I” was paired 
with positive words (experimental condition) while the other half of the participants worked 
on trials in which the word I was repeatedly paired with neutral words (control condition).  
 Based on the considerations outlined above, we expected an EC effect to emerge only 
for implicit self-esteem, but not with respect to explicit self-esteem. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that implicit self-esteem should be more favourable in the experimental 
condition compared to the control condition. In contrast it was predicted that explicit self-
esteem judgements would be unaffected by the EC manipulation (see Baccus et al., 2004).   
Method  
 Participants and Design. 80 undergraduate psychology-students (70 women and 10 
men) of the University of Leipzig participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. 
Their mean age was 23.3 years (SD = 4.76), and they were randomly assigned to either the 
experimental or the control condition.  
 Materials. Evaluative conditioning: The procedure of the EC paradigm was similar to 
the one employed by Dijksterhuis (2004): It involved a subliminal presentation of the CS as 
well as a subliminal presentation of positive or neutral US. As CS, we used the German word 
for “I” (Ich), as US we used positive adjectives and neutral non-words. The evaluative 
conditioning task was masked as a lexical decision task with 30 trials, preceded by two trials 
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designed as training. On each trial, participants were first presented with a masking stimulus 
(i.e., a row of Xs) that appeared for 500 ms on the computer screen. The row of Xs was then 
replaced by the CS which was presented for 17ms. Depending on condition, positive 
adjectives or neutral non-words appeared on the screen for 17ms immediately afterwards. In 
the experimental condition, the CS was always followed by positive trait words. 15 different 
traits were used1. Each word was presented twice during the 30 trials. In the control group the 
word “I” was always paired with one of 15 evaluative neutral non-words. The US was then 
replaced by a random letter string. Participants’ task was to decide whether this random letter 
string began with a consonant or with a vowel. To indicate their answer they were asked to 
press either the “A” key for a vowel or the “L” key for a consonant. As soon as participants 
pressed one of the two keys the random letter string disappeared and the next trial began. All 
words were presented in white letters on a black screen. 
 Measures of Self-Esteem: Participants’ implicit self-esteem2 was assessed with a 
German version of the self-esteem IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The IAT procedure 
consisted of seven blocks separated by a short pause for instructions. In the first block, twelve 
stimuli characterizing the individual participant (family name, own Christian name, month of 
birth, place of birth, gender, zodiac) or a completely different person (different family name, 
different Christian name, etc.) had to be assigned to categories “Self” or “Other”, respectively. 
Participants were asked to press a left-hand key when a stimulus characterizing the own 
person appeared on the screen and a right hand key when a stimulus characterizing another 
person appeared. In the second block participants had to discriminate between the categories 
“Positive” and “Negative” by classifying six positive (left-hand key) and six negative (right-
hand key) adjectives according to their category membership3. In the first combined blocks 
(Block 3 and 4), participants were presented with the six positive words, the six negative 
words, the six self-related words and the six other-related words. Participants had to press a 
left-hand key whenever a positive or self-related word appeared, and to press a right-hand key 
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whenever a negative or other-related word appeared. Throughout this task, the category labels 
“Self” and “Positive” remained on the left-hand side of the screen and the category labels 
“Other” and “Negative” on the right-hand side. In Block 5, the initial attribute discrimination 
task (i.e., Block 2) was repeated with a switch of the categorization keys. In Block 6 and 7 the 
combined task was repeated, this time, however, participants had to press the left-hand key 
whenever a self-related or a negative word appeared on the screen, and they had to press the 
right-hand key when either an other-related or a positive word was presented. The order of the 
presentation of the single stimuli in each block was randomized, but all participants went 
through the IAT blocks in the same order. 
 To measure participants’ explicit self-esteem a semantic differential and a German 
version (Schütz, 1996) of the state-self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) were used. 
With regard to the first measure, six pairs of polar-opposite adjectives were presented (i.e., 
pleasant-unpleasant, valuable-useless, nice-awful, high-low, good-bad and successful-
unsuccessful), and participants were asked to describe themselves on each adjective pair by 
checking one of the points on a 7-point response scale between the adjectives that would 
resemble their self-evaluation. The scale to assess state-self-esteem consisted of 20 items 
representing three dimensions of state-self-esteem (social self-esteem, performance self-
esteem and self-esteem regarding the own appearance). The items had to be answered on a 
five-point scale ranging from 1 (completely false) to 5 (completely true). 
 Procedure. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were welcomed by a female 
experimenter and seated in front of a computer. Written instructions explained that they 
would be taking part in a study on person perception. Participants then completed the lexical 
decision task that included the evaluative conditioning. Thereafter, participants completed the 
indirect and direct measures of self-esteem. The order of the two measures was 
counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the session, participants were debriefed 
carefully. Specifically, they were asked whether they had seen anything unusual during the 
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lexical decision task, and they were asked if they had seen any flashes on the screen. No 
participant showed any suspicion, and no participant had seen any flashes.     
Results and Discussion 
 An initial analysis established that the order of the presentation of the indirect and direct 
measures neither had a significant impact on the IAT-effect nor on self-reported self-esteem. 
Consequently this factor was omitted from further analyses. 
 Explicit Self-Esteem. We computed two indices of participants’ explicit self-esteem: The 
first index was calculated by summing up subjects’ responses to the semantic differential 
(Cronbach’s  = .75), and the second was computed by summing up the responses to the 20 
state-self-esteem-scale items (Cronbach’s  = .81). Table 1 gives the scores and standard 
deviations of both measures in the different experimental conditions. As a simple inspection 
of the means reveals, the evaluative conditioning procedure had no impact on the self-report 
measures. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with type of conditioning as the 
between-subjects factor supported this impression by revealing neither a significant main 
effect for conditioning on state self-esteem nor on the semantic differential (Fs < 1.8). 
 Implicit Self-Esteem. The IAT data were computed according to the improved scoring 
algorithm proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Specifically, the D1-measure 
with a built-in error penalty was chosen. IAT scores were calculated such that higher scores 
indicate a stronger association between self and positive aspects. Furthermore, we calculated 
the reliability of the IAT-D1-effects by applying the algorithm separately to two mutually 
exclusive subsets of trials of the IATs. The Spearman-Brown adjusted split-half correlation 
was rtt = .74. The means and standard deviations are given in Table 1. As can be seen, the IAT 
effect was more pronounced in the experimental condition compared with the control 
condition, indicating that evaluative conditioning had the expected effect on implicit self-
esteem. Supporting this impression, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
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Conditioning as the between-subjects factor yielded a significant main effect of Conditioning 
(F(1, 76) = 13.32, p < .01, 2 = 0.15). 
 To sum up the results of Study 1, we found clear evidence for a conditioning effect on 
indirect self-esteem measures, but not on self-reported self-esteem. Thus, consistent with 
earlier experiments (e.g., Baccus et al., 2004), an asymmetrical pattern of self-esteem change 
was found after evaluative conditioning. This asymmetrical pattern of changes was also 
displayed in the correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem measures (IAT and 
semantic differential: r = .13, IAT and state-self-esteem: r = -.06). In contrast the two explicit 
measures correlated with an r = .62, p < .01.  
Experiment 2 
 While Experiment 1 established that implicit self-esteem can be enhanced using an 
evaluative conditioning procedure, the second experiment sought to provide evidence that an 
appropriate experimental manipulation might influence explicit self-esteem while leaving 
implicit self-esteem unchanged. According to the assumptions outlined above, this should be 
the case when participants are asked to retrieve evaluative information about the self. 
Specifically, when the information they have deliberatively retrieved is inconsistent with their 
original judgement of the self (e.g., retrieval of negative information and a positive self-view), 
this should promote a different judgement. If the information, in contrast, is consistent, this 
should leave the original judgement unchanged or might lead to a polarized judgment (e.g., 
retrieval of positive information and a positive self-view). However, since the additional 
consideration of new or additional information should have no direct or immediate effects on 
automatic evaluations or the structure of associations in memory, no change in implicit self-
evaluations was expected.    
 The manipulation that was intended to change the focal set of information was a directed 
thinking task originally employed by McGuire and McGuire (1996). In their research some 
subjects were asked to list characteristics that they possessed, and others were asked to list 
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characteristics that they lacked. Additionally, some participants listed desirable characteristics 
and some listed undesirable characteristics. McGuire and McGuire (1996) found that thinking 
about desirable characteristics possessed or undesirable characteristics lacked, lead to an 
increase in self-reported self-esteem while a decrease was found when participants listed 
desirable characteristics that they lacked or undesirable characteristics that they possessed.  
 In order to test our assumptions, participants in our experiment were asked – similar to 
McGuire and McGuire (1996) – to name characteristics that they possess or that they lack, 
respectively. Additionally, some were asked to list desirable characteristics and others were 
asked to list undesirable characteristics. Afterwards, all participants completed a direct and an 
indirect measure of self-esteem. Based on the considerations outlined above, we expected to 
find a self-esteem change in direct, but not in indirect measures of self-esteem. More 
precisely, explicit self-esteem was predicted to be higher when participants were asked to list 
undesirable characteristics that they lack or to generate desirable characteristics that they 
posses, compared to listing undesirable characteristics that they possess or desirable 
characteristics that they lack. Implicit self-esteem, in contrast, was expected to be unaffected 
by the directed thinking manipulation.  
Method 
 Participants and Design. 80 psychology undergraduates (60 women and 20 men) of the 
University of Leipzig participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. Their mean 
age was 23.3 years (SD = 5.77). They were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
conditions defined by a 2 (Possession: possessed vs. lacked) × 2 (Type of Characteristic: 
desirable vs. undesirable) between-subjects design.  
 Materials. Directed thinking task: To influence participants’ explicit self-esteem we 
used the directed thinking task originally employed by McGuire and McGuire (1996). 
Participants were given one of four thought-generating tasks defined by the 2 × 2 Design. 
That is, they were asked to “write down as many desirable (undesirable) characteristics as you 
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can that you do (do not) have”. In each condition, one of these four instructions was printed 
on the top of the page, while the rest of the page contained 20 empty lines. Participants were 
given a three minute allowance to list the requested information.  
 Measures of Self-Esteem: We used the same IAT and the same explicit self-esteem 
measures as in Experiment 1. To control for possible effects of our manipulation on 
participants’ mood, they were additionally asked to complete a German version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 
1996) which consists of twenty mood-describing adjectives. The items had to be answered on 
a five-point scale indicating how much each item described the participant’s mood at the 
moment from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). 
 Procedure. When participants arrived, they were welcomed by a female experimenter 
and were seated in front of a computer. Participants began the experiment with the directed 
thinking task. Then, they were asked to take an unrelated filler questionnaire. This task lasted 
approximately five minutes. Afterwards all participants answered the PANAS. Thereafter, 
participants completed the indirect and direct self-esteem measures, whereby the order of the 
direct and indirect self-esteem measures was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analyses were performed to examine if the order of the presentation of the 
implicit and explicit measure on the dependent variables. No test involving this variable was 
statistically significant. Hence, the remaining tests were performed by pooling across the 
order factor.  
 Explicit Self-Esteem. As before, we computed two indices of participants’ explicit self-
esteem. While the first index was calculated by summing up subjects’ responses to the 
semantic differential (Cronbach’s  = .69), the second was computed by summing up the 
responses to the 20 state-self-esteem-scale items (Cronbach’s  = .85). Table 2 gives the 
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scores and standard deviations of both measures in the different experimental conditions. As 
the pattern of means in Table 2 shows, the directed thinking task had the expected effect: 
Participants who listed desirable characteristics that they possessed, and subjects who 
reported undesirable characteristics that they lacked showed higher values in self-reported 
self-esteem than participants in the other two conditions. A 2 (Possession) × 2 (Type of 
Characteristic) between-subjects ANOVA using the sum scores of the semantic differentials 
as dependent variable supported this impression by yielding a significant interaction between 
the factors Possession and Type of Characteristic, F(1, 76) = 9.73, p < .01, 2 = 0.11. No 
significant main effect of Possession emerged (F < 1), but the main effect of Type of 
Characteristic was marginally significant (F(1, 76) = 2.93, p = .09, 2 = 0.04). Similar results 
were obtained for the second explicit self-esteem score, albeit the effect was somewhat 
weaker: A 2 (Type of Characteristic) × 2 (Possession) between-subjects ANOVA yielded no 
significant main effects (Fs < 1.5), but a significant interaction, F(1, 76) = 7.00, p = .01, 2 = 
0.08. Because the Levene-Test checking for symmetrical error variances yielded that the 
standard deviations were not identical in the four experimental groups we computed planned 
linear contrasts with a control for variance inhomogeneity. The participants who were 
instructed to think about positive aspects of their selves (desirable characteristics possessed, 
undesirable characteristics lacked) proved higher values in explicit self-esteem than the 
participants of the other two groups (semantic differential: t(55.28) = 3.12, p < .01, reffect = 
0.33, state-self-esteem-Scale: t(58.96) = 2.65, p = .01, reffect = 0.29). The results of this 
analysis support the results of the ANOVA.  
 Influences of Mood. To check whether changes in participants’ explicit self-esteem were 
mediated by changes in their mood (positive or negative affect), we additionally performed a 
mediation analysis in which the contrast-coded independent variable and participants’ mood 
ratings (positive and negative affect) were used to predict subjects’ self-reported self-esteem. 
This analyses yielded no significant results, however (Aroian variant of the Sobel-Test for 
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positive affect: semantic differential: z = 1.05, p = .29; state-self-esteem-scale: z = 1.11, p = 
.27; Aroian variant of the Sobel-Test for negative affect: semantic differential: z = 0.18, p = 
.86; state-self-esteem-scale: z = 0.19, p = .85).  
 Implicit Self-Esteem. As in Experiment 1, we used the D1-algorithm to aggregate the 
IAT data (Greenwald et al., 2003), and IAT scores were calculated such that higher scores 
indicate a stronger association between self and positive aspects. Further analyses ensured 
sufficient reliability of the IAT-D1-effects. When we applied the algorithm separately to two 
mutually exclusive subsets of trials, the Spearman-Brown adjusted split-half correlation was 
rtt = .74. Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations of IAT scores. Submitted to a 2 
(Type of Characteristic) × 2 (Possession) between-subjects ANOVA, IAT scores revealed 
neither significant main effects nor a significant interaction (Fs < 1.1).  
 The correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem measures were: r = .00 (IAT 
and semantic differential) and r = -.23, p < .05 (IAT and state-self-esteem), respectively. The 
two explicit measures of self-esteem correlated with an r = .48, p < .01.  
 In sum, the pattern of results is consistent with McGuire and McGuire’s (1996) finding 
and with our hypotheses. Specifically, explicit self-esteem was higher in the conditions in 
which participants were asked to list desirable characteristics that they possess or undesirable 
characteristics that they lack, respectively, compared with participants in the other two 
conditions. Implicit self-esteem, in contrast, was unaffected by this manipulation. Taken 
together, the results of Experiment 2 offer convincing evidence for the hypotheses that a 
condition which affects momentarily activated propositional self-knowledge leads to explicit 
but not to implicit self-esteem change. Consequently our results support the claim that explicit 
self-esteem is influenced by changes in propositional knowledge whereas the results illustrate 
that changes in propositional processes did not alter implicit self-esteem. However, it might 
be possible that manipulations of propositional knowledge, which are of stronger intensity or 
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duration, would also alter implicit self-esteem (cf., Rydell et al., 2006 for an example 
concerning attitudes toward a fictive person called Bob). 
Experiment 3 
 While Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 established asymmetrical patterns of self-esteem 
change (either implicit or explicit self-esteem were influenced), Experiment 3 was conducted 
with the aim to investigate if changes in implicit self-esteem can be transferred to the explicit 
level. With the help of the evaluative conditioning procedure (see Experiment 1) we 
influenced the structure of positive associations that are related to the self in people’s minds. 
Drawing on the assumptions of the APE-Model these associations can be used as a basis for 
explicit judgements about the own self if they are considered as correct. On the other hand 
these associations may also be rejected as a basis for explicit judgements if they are 
considered as incorrect, false or invalid. Based on these ideas we postulated that it should be 
possible to transfer the changes that the EC procedure caused in implicit self-esteem to the 
level of explicit self-esteem. But therefore we had to ensure that participants relied on their 
automatic affective reactions as basis for their evaluative self-judgment. In accordance with 
previous research (Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989) it was hypothesised that thinking 
about feelings would enhance the salience of the automatic affective reaction and would thus 
cause participants to ground their explicit self-judgments on the affective reaction. 
Consequently an increase in the level of explicit self-esteem should be detectable.  
 On the other hand it was expected that focusing on further self-knowledge or thinking 
about self-knowledge would decrease the influence of the automatic affective reaction 
because the automatic affective reaction might be rejected as a valid basis for the explicit self-
judgment and participants might base their judgment on the retrieved self-knowledge. Hence, 
the positive automatic affective reaction after a positive evaluative conditioning will not be 
taken as a basis for an evaluative judgement and the level of explicit self-esteem will not 
change in this condition. 
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 Recent research by Gawronski, LeBel, Heilpern, and Wilbur (2007) supports these 
contentions for prejudice. In their experiment, some participants were asked to take a positive 
evaluative conditioning procedure concerning Asia and a negative one concerning Europe 
(evaluation of the concepts was counterbalanced across participants). Afterwards, some were 
asked to focus on their feelings while others were asked to focus on their knowledge 
concerning the attitude object Asia. The results showed that evaluative conditioning led to 
more positive implicit attitudes towards Asia irrespective of the introspection manipulation. In 
contrast, explicit attitudes were only affected when individuals were asked to focus on their 
feelings towards Asia, but not when they were asked to focus on their knowledge towards 
Asia. Thus, asking participants to focus on their feelings led to a transfer of the evaluative 
conditioning effect on explicit attitudes. 
 Taken together, we expected to find self-esteem changes in indirect self-esteem 
measures (cf., Experiment 1) irrespective of whether subjects focused on their feelings or their 
knowledge. In contrast, we predicted a change in explicit self-esteem following a positive 
evaluative conditioning procedure if participants were asked to focus on their feelings toward 
themselves, because in this manipulation condition participants should ground their explicit 
self evaluation on their automatic affective reaction. Such a transfer effect was not expected 
when participants were asked to focus on their knowledge about the self, because under this 
condition the automatic affective reaction would be rejected as a valid basis of the explicit 
self-judgment. 
Method 
 Participants and Design. A total of 64 participants (38 women, 26 men) participated in 
the experiment. Their mean age was 24.2 years (SD = 6.61), and they were randomly assigned 
to one of four experimental conditions defined by a 2 (Conditioning: positive vs. negative) × 2 
(Introspection: feeling vs. knowledge) between-subjects design.   
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 Materials. We used the same indirect and direct measures of self-esteem as in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Furthermore, the evaluative conditioning procedure was exactly the same 
as in Experiment 1.  
 Introspection manipulation: The introspection manipulation largely resembled the one 
employed by Gawronski et al. (2007). Specifically, half of the participants were asked to: 
“Take a few minutes to think about your momentary feelings toward yourself.” (i.e., feeling 
condition) while the remaining half was asked to: “Think about knowledge that you have 
about yourself.” (i.e., thinking condition). Participants in both conditions were instructed to 
write down their thoughts on a sheet of paper.  
 Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were welcomed by a female 
experimenter and seated in front of a computer. Participants first completed the lexical 
decision task that included the evaluative conditioning. Thereafter, participants were asked to 
take the introspection task, and then to complete the implicit and the explicit self-esteem 
measures, whereby the order of the two measures was counterbalanced across participants. 
Finally, participants were debriefed carefully. Specifically, they were asked whether they had 
seen anything unusual during the lexical decision task, and they were asked if they had seen 
any flashes on the screen. No participant showed any suspicion, or had seen any flashes.     
Results and Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1 and 2, preliminary analyses established that the order of presentation 
of the explicit and implicit self-esteem measures had no significant effect on the dependent 
measures. Consequently, the remaining analyses were done pooling across this factor.  
 Implicit Self-Esteem. As in Experiments 1 and 2 the data were aggregated using the D1-
scoring algorithm proposed by Greenwald et al. (2003) so that higher scores indicate a higher 
implicit self-esteem (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Furthermore, we 
calculated the Spearman-Brown adjusted split-half correlation as a measure of the reliability 
of the IAT (rtt = .74). To analyse if our manipulations had the intended effects, the IAT scores 
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were submitted to a 2 (Introspection) × 2 (Conditioning) between-subjects ANOVA. As 
expected, a significant main effect of Conditioning emerged, F(1, 60) = 6.09, p = .02, 2 = 
0.09, indicating a higher implicit self esteem after a positive evaluative conditioning of the 
self (M = 0.66) compared to the neutral evaluative conditioning group (M = 0.50). Neither a 
main effect of the Introspection factor nor an interaction effect of Introspection and 
Conditioning emerged (Fs < 1).  
 Explicit Self-Esteem. The means of the sum-scores and standard deviations are presented 
separately for the evaluative conditioning and introspection groups (see Table 3). The internal 
consistencies of the explicit self-esteem measures were quite different this time (semantic 
differential  = .59, state-self-esteem scale  = .83). In order to test the effects of the 
evaluative conditioning manipulation and the introspection manipulation on explicit self-
esteem we submitted the two indices of explicit self-esteem separately to a 2 (Introspection) × 
2 (Conditioning) univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with both factors as between-
subject factors. For the sum-scores of the state-self-esteem-scale the analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between both factors (F(1, 60) = 4.29, p = .04, 2 = 0.07) and no 
significant main effects (Fs < 2.11, df = 1 / 60, ps > .15). An inspection of the means indicated 
that the evaluative conditioning manipulation had an effect on explicit self-esteem only if 
participants focused on their feelings, but not when they were asked to focus on knowledge 
about themselves. Specifically, participants in the feelings condition showed higher values in 
explicit self-esteem under positive evaluative conditioning (M = 79.87) than under 
conditioning with evaluative neutral non-words (M = 71.69), t(30) = 2.72, p = .01, d = 0.96. 
On the other hand, no such difference of conditioning manipulation could be observed for 
participants in the thinking condition, t < 1. In accordance with our hypothesis, a planned 
linear contrast revealed that participants in the positive evaluative conditioning group who 
were thinking about feelings exhibited the highest values in explicit self-esteem compared to 
the other three experimental groups (t(60) = 2.55, p = .01, reffect = 0.31, contrast weights +3, -
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1, -1 und -1), whereas the other three groups did not differ significantly (all ts < 1). For the 
semantic differential scores, however, no significant main effects for Introspection (F(1, 
60) = 2.64, p = .11, 2 = 0.04) and Evaluative Conditioning (F < 1) were found and no 
significant interaction was observed (F < 1)4. 
 Correlations. Overall we found no notable correlations between explicit and implicit 
self-esteem in the whole sample measures (IAT and semantic differential: r = -.04, IAT and 
state-self-esteem: r = -.05). 
 In sum, the results from Experiment 3 replicated and extended the results from 
Experiment 1. In particular, the evaluative conditioning procedure influenced implicit self-
esteem regardless of whether participants focused on their feelings concerning themselves or 
on their knowledge about themselves. In contrast, explicit self-esteem was affected by the 
evaluative conditioning procedure only when participants focused on their feelings, but not 
when they focused on their knowledge: Subjects in the former condition judged themselves 
more favourably after a positive evaluative conditioning of the self than participants in the 
latter condition. Thus, consistent with our assumptions and with the results of Gawronski et 
al. (2007), implicit self-esteem was transferred to the explicit level when participants’ focus 
was directed to their immediate affective reaction regarding themselves, but not when they 
considered additional pieces of information when making their judgements.  
General Discussion 
 Based on recently proposed dual-process models, we investigated the conditions under 
which implicit but not explicit self-esteem or explicit but not implicit self-esteem could be 
changed, given appropriate manipulations that can be assumed to have an impact on the 
cognitive processes (propositions or associations) involved. Specifically, we assumed that 
evaluative conditioning should lead to an alteration in implicit but not explicit self-esteem, 
while a directed thinking task should change explicit but not implicit self-esteem.  
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 The results of our experiments supported our contentions: Participants who were asked 
to complete a subliminal evaluative conditioning (EC) procedure in which a self-relevant 
stimulus was repeatedly paired with positive words showed an increase in implicit self-esteem 
(measured by means of an IAT), compared to participants in the control condition. 
Additionally, their directly assessed self-esteem (state-self-esteem scale) was unaffected by 
the EC manipulation (Experiment 1). In contrast, asking participants to list desirable or 
undesirable characteristics that they possess or that they lack, respectively, led to a change in 
self-reported self-esteem but not in indirectly assessed self-esteem. Thus, consistent with the 
assumptions of recent dual-process models (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell et al., 
2006), implicit self-esteem was affected when an associative learning procedure was used to 
modify self-related evaluative associations in memory while explicit self-esteem was 
influenced when the salience of self-relevant information was manipulated (Experiment 2).   
 Experiment 3 built on the successful enhancement of implicit self-esteem through 
evaluative conditioning, assuming that the change in implicit self-esteem will subsequently be 
transferred to explicit self-esteem. Conceptually, the basic idea was to enhance the 
participants’ focus on their affective reactions by making them think about their feelings 
towards themselves (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski et al., 2007) as opposed to 
letting them to think about their knowledge concerning themselves. The results of Experiment 
3 indicate that this manipulation was successful: Asking participants to think about their 
feelings but not the consideration of knowledge led to an increase in implicit as well as 
explicit self-esteem.  
 In sum, our results show that implicit self-esteem is enhanced when an associative 
learning procedure is used leaving explicit self-esteem unchanged, while explicit self-esteem 
can be influenced when a manipulation directed at propositional thinking is introduced which 
does not affect implicit self-esteem. Our results of Experiment 1 are in accordance with the 
results of Rydell et al. (2006), who demonstrated that a subliminal conditioning task has the 
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potential to alter implicit attitudes, whereas explicit attitudes remained unchanged. Of course 
one might object that explicit attitudes could have changed as well after manipulating the 
associative structure of self-evaluations. Following the theoretical rationale of dual-process 
models, especially the APE-Model, it is possible that a change in associative structures can 
result in a change in propositional processes as well. However, this will only happen if a 
person recognizes these changes (cf., Experiment 3 – focusing on feelings). The APE-Model 
postulates that the automatic affective reaction has the potential to enter consciousness and 
that it can be transferred into a propositional format, but an influence on the explicit judgment 
will only occur if a person trusts and relies on this affect. This was the case in Experiment 3 
where such an effect could be demonstrated.  
 A similar objection could be articulated with respect to Experiment 2. Specifically, one 
could argue that a manipulation directed at propositional knowledge should also alter implicit 
self-esteem. For instance, thinking about the self could also strengthen or weaken associations 
between the self and positivity or negativity. But this is empirically seldom the case, as 
Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) or Rydell et al. (2006) demonstrated. These authors showed 
that changes in propositional knowledge about a certain person or group do not necessarily 
affect implicit attitudes. Rather a transfer from the implicit to the explicit level is time 
consuming and needs lots of learning trials. These conditions were not given in our second 
experiment, as participants considered eight to ten characteristics on average. 
 On a more general level, our results fit nicely with the assumptions of recently proposed 
dual-process models like the Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM) of Strack and Deutsch (2004) 
or the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006). 
They seem, however, to be inconsistent with dual-process models which assume that implicit 
attitudes assessed with indirect measures are highly stable and difficult to change (see Wilson 
et al., 2000; Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006), because these models can not account for 
an asymmetrical pattern of self-esteem change that involves an alteration of implicit but not 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                         Changing Explicit and Implicit Attitudes         24
explicit self-esteem (see Experiment 1 or 3, respectively). The RIM or the APE-Model, in 
contrast, allow for such patterns. The APE-Model, for instance, states that attitudes 
(concerning oneself or other entities), have their roots in two different types of mental 
processes, an associative and a propositional one. Whereas the former reflects spontaneous 
affective reactions to an attitude object that are typically assessed by means of indirect 
measures, the latter builds the basis for evaluative judgements whose outcomes are assessed 
with self-report measures. Given that the propositional image of affective reactions is 
sometimes inconsistent with other propositions that are considered for a judgement, the APE-
model can not only explain why implicit and explicit attitudes might be dissociated, but also 
when and under which circumstances asymmetrical patterns of attitude change should emerge 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2007). For example, if a manipulation method changes the 
affective reaction toward an attitude object, and other relevant propositions are inconsistent 
with this evaluation, the manipulation should affect implicit but not explicit attitudes. In 
contrast, if a certain manipulation influences the propositions that are considered for a 
judgement, but there is no influence on the associative processes, this manipulation should 
influence explicit but not implicit attitudes. Our results support these assumptions. 
Nonetheless, it has to be pointed out that our results are not only suggestive for the RIM- or 
the APE-Model, respectively. Most of the currently popular dual-process models could 
integrate our findings into their assumptions and it is difficult to test these models against 
each other, because many predictions concerning the change of self-esteem in particular and 
of attitudes in general can be derived from more than one dual-process model. Although we 
can not plead for one particular dual-process model to be the best in integrating our findings 
we can clearly articulate that our findings are not compatible with the assumptions of Wilson 
et al. (2000), who postulate that implicit attitudes are hardly changeable. This assumption is 
challenged by the results of Experiments 1 and 3, indicating changes in implicit, but not 
necessarily explicit self-esteem after an evaluative conditioning manipulation.  
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 Our results did not only offer clear evidence for asymmetrical patterns of change in 
implicit and explicit self-esteem, but they also demonstrated that a transfer of manipulation 
effects is possible. Specifically, the results of our third experiment support the idea that an 
emotion based focus enables a transfer of the effects of evaluative conditioning on implicit 
self-esteem to explicit self-esteem. Comparable results were recently presented by Egloff, 
Weck, and Schmukle (in press), who demonstrated stronger correlations between implicit and 
explicit anxiety after thinking about anxiety related situations. In connection with the 
transferability of effects of a certain manipulation method from implicit to explicit self-
esteem, the question of awareness of implicit/explicit self-esteem is really central. While 
some researchers argue that people can be aware of their implicit attitudes, others posit that 
implicit attitudes are unconscious (see De Houwer & Moors, 2007). From our point of view it 
seems to be more fruitful to define implicit attitudes as accessible to consciousness in a 
certain manner. Whether this consciousness is limited to an intuition or a feeling can not be 
answered with the help of our data and should be addressed in future research. A first study 
on this issue comes from Jordan, Whitfield, and Zeigler-Hill (2007, see also Olson, Fazio, & 
Hermann, 2007). The authors posit that people can be consciously aware of their implicit self-
esteem in the form of an intuitive global judgment. In four studies Jordan et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that people trusting in their intuitions exhibited stronger correlations between 
implicit and explicit self-esteem than people with lower faith in their intuitions. 
 For future research it might also be interesting to concentrate on the effects a particular 
manipulation has on nonverbal or on controlled behaviour, respectively, in addition to implicit 
or explicit self-esteem/attitudes. We would expect that manipulation methods influencing 
associations in memory (e.g., evaluative conditioning) can also influence nonverbal 
behaviour, whereas a manipulation method influencing propositional processes should be able 
to change controlled behaviour. In the context of implicit and explicit self-esteem, nonverbal 
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anxiety, self-handicapping and self-rated anxiety in a social interview situation could be 
interesting behaviours to study in more detail (see Spalding & Hardin, 1999).  
 Taken together, our results fit with the assumptions of recently proposed dual-process 
models, positing that implicit and explicit attitudes are the result of two qualitatively distinct 
kinds of mental processes reacting to different manipulation methods. Hence, these models 
seem to offer a convincing theoretical framework to integrate empirical findings of attitudinal 
dissociation and should be used to derive predictions for future work concerning attitude 
change. 
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Footnotes 
 1
  The terms were gut (good), fair (fair), froh (happy), warm (warm), zart (gentle), aktiv 
(active), human (human), schön (beautiful), gesund (healthy), heiter (cheerful), lustig 
(amusing), sozial (social), witzig (funny), ehrlich (honest), kreativ (creative). All of them 
were selected according to their valence from German norm tables (Hager & Hasselhorn, 
1994).  
 2
  In all three experiments participants were additionally asked to complete a self-esteem 
version of the Single Target Implicit Association Test (see Wigboldus, Holland, & van 
Knippenberg, 2006) as well as a Name-Letter-Task (NLT; cf., Nuttin, 1985). However, since 
analyses using the ST-IAT and the NLT effects as the dependent measures yielded essentially 
the same results as analyses using the IAT effect, only the effects concerning the standard 
IAT are reported here (concerning the ST-IAT are not discussed here any further). The 
finding of corresponding effects in several implicit measures can be taken as evidence against 
an objection concerning a dissociation of different implicit measures. 
 3
  The positive words were wertvoll (precious), zufrieden (satisfied), angenehm 
(pleasant), sonnig (sunny), glücklich (happy), gut (sound). Negative words were nutzlos 
(useless), schlecht (bad), gierig (greedy), unangenehm (unpleasant), ungerecht (unjust), 
traurig (sad).   
 
4
 The low internal consistency of the semantic differential to measure self-evaluations 
could not really be improved (from  = .59 to  = .64) by eliminating a single item. Given this 
low internal consistency we doubt the usefulness of this scale as a dependent variable in 
Experiment 3. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem Measures in Experiment 
1. 
 Positive conditioning Neutral conditioning 
Dependent measures M SD M SD 
Semantic differential 33.40 3.10 34.15 3.51 
State-self-esteem 75.80 9.89 78.85 7.20 
IAT-D-effect 0.72 0.22 0.57 0.21 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem Measures in Experiment 
2 
 Desirable 
features possess 
Desirable 
features lack 
Undesirable 
features possess 
Undesirable 
features lack 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Semantic 
differential 
35.30 2.54 32.50 2.82 31.70 4.78 33.55 2.68 
State-self-esteem 78.45 7.67 75.10 10.83 71.45 14.34 80.55 7.83 
IAT-D-effect   0.69 0.31  0.65 0.26  0.62 0.24  0.59 0.21 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem Measures in Experiment 
3 
 Positive 
conditioning, 
knowledge 
Positive 
conditioning, 
feelings 
Neutral 
conditioning, 
knowledge 
Neutral 
conditioning, 
feelings 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Semantic 
differential 
32.38 3.95 34.13 2.94 32.63 2.70 33.31 2.12 
State-self-esteem 73.00 10.83 79.88 9.04 74.44 9.11 71.69 7.99 
IAT-D-effect   0.68 0.21  0.63 0.17  0.50 0.29  0.51 0.29 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Means of the state-self-esteem questionnaire in the four experimental groups 
(1 = desirable possess, 2 = desirable lack, 3 = undesirable possess, 4 = undesirable lack; 
pointed bars represent groups thinking about negative characteristics; striped bars represent 
groups thinking about positive characteristics.) 
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